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Abstract
Scholars of international relations and global governance are increasingly interested in the
transnational commercial arbitration system. So far, they have tended to characterize the system as
a form of private global governance. However, using a combination of empirical and legal
analysis, this article draws attention to the critical role of the state in the transnational commercial
arbitration system, and shows that both rule-making and enforcement in the system depend largely
on interactions between private and public actors. By treating arbitration as a form of private
governance, scholars run the risk of obscuring these interactions and hindering their understanding
of how transnational economic activity is governed. This article therefore argues for a modest
reorientation of global governance scholarship on transnational commercial arbitration in a
direction that focuses more closely on private-public interaction. More broadly, this article
suggests that understanding interactions between private and public actors is a key to
understanding global governance in general, and it raises doubts about the analytical desirability of
a sharp distinction between private and public forms of global governance.
KEYWORDS: private governance, IPE, regulation
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1. Introduction
Scholars of global governance are increasingly interested in transnational
commercial arbitration—the binding resolution of transnational commercial
disputes by private third-party decision makers.1 The emerging interdisciplinary
scholarship on the transnational commercial arbitration system has the potential to
make important contributions to our understanding of global governance. The
system offers dispute resolution services that are widely used by transnational
actors, and it provides a process for the interpretation and enforcement of
contracts, which are the backbone of transnational commerce. By understanding
arbitration, scholars can better understand the governance of transnational
commerce.
The study of transnational commercial arbitration also can shed new light
on the role of private actors in global governance, thus contributing to the
continuing efforts of scholars of international relations to move beyond traditional
state-focused analysis.2 Two questions have traditionally been at the core of
social science scholarship on governance: Harold Lasswell’s “who gets what”
question3 and Robert Dahl’s “who governs” question.4 Transnational commercial
arbitration involves private third parties (arbitrators) answering the “who gets
what” question in disputes between transnational commercial actors. It is
therefore natural to think of transnational commercial arbitration as a system of
global governance in which private actors are the “governors.”5 Various scholars
have therefore characterized transnational commercial arbitration as a form of
private global governance.6
In this article, I use a combination of empirical and legal analysis to draw
attention to the critical role of the state in the transnational commercial arbitration
system, and I show that both rule-making and enforcement in the system depend
largely on interactions between private and public actors. Conceptually,
arbitration does not fit neatly into established categories of “private” or “public”
governance. By treating arbitration as a form of private governance, scholars run
the risk of obscuring the role of the state and its interactions with private actors,
1

E.g. Cutler 1995, 2001, 2003; Gal-Or 2008; Mattli 2001; Stone Sweet 2002, 2006.
E.g. Büthe 2004; Cutler et al 1999; Graz & Nölke 2008; Hall & Biersteker 2002.
3
Lasswell 1936; Caporaso et al 2008, 406.
4
Dahl 1961.
5
On the concept of “global governors,” see Avant et al (2010).
6
E.g. Gal-Or 2008, 219 (discussing arbitration as part of the “formal institutionalization of
transnational private governance”); Mattli 2001, 919 (discussing transnational commercial
arbitration as a “private international institutional arrangement”); Stone Sweet 2006, 628
(discussing transnational commercial arbitration as part of “a private system of governance for
transnational business”); Whytock 2008a, 457 (describing transnational arbitration as part of
“transnational private governance”).
2
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thus hindering their understanding of how transnational economic activity is
governed. I therefore argue for a modest reorientation of global governance
scholarship on the transnational commercial arbitration system, according to
which scholars would conceptualize the system as a mixed private-public form of
governance and place more emphasis on understanding private-public interaction
in the system. A broader implication of the article’s analysis is that understanding
private-public interaction is a key to understanding global governance in general.7
Part 2 provides an overview of transnational commercial arbitration as a
system of global governance. Any system of governance must provide for the
setting of rules and their enforcement.8 The remainder of the paper thus analyzes
several different types of data to shed empirical light on who makes the rules in
the transnational commercial arbitration system, and who enforces them. Part 3
shows how private and public actors together make not only the rules governing
the overall system, but also the procedural and substantive rules governing
particular arbitral proceedings. Next, Part 4 shows how both private and public
actors help mitigate enforcement problems in the transnational commercial
arbitration system. These problems include enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate, as well as enforcement of arbitrators’ decisions. Throughout the article,
I complement the empirical analysis with insights from legal scholarship that
recognizes the system’s hybrid nature, scholarship which may be useful for
scholars of global governance interested in transnational commercial arbitration.9
I conclude by drawing out some of the broader implications of the analysis.
2. Transnational Commercial Arbitration and Global Governance
2.1 An Overview of the Transnational Commercial Arbitration System
Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution whereby two or more parties
(“disputants”) submit their dispute to a third-party decision maker (the
“arbitrator”). The party initiating arbitration is the “claimant,” and the other party
is the “respondent.” Arbitration has four defining characteristics. First, the
arbitrator is a private actor selected by the disputants themselves, or in accordance
with a procedure agreed in advance by the disputants. Often, there are several
arbitrators. Second, arbitration is consensual. An arbitrator cannot resolve a
dispute unless the disputants have agreed to have the arbitrator resolve that
7

Similarly, Bartley argues that “scholars of private regulation should abandon the image of global
standards bypassing the state and transcending old configurations of power and instead attend to
the fascinating ways in which standards are filtered, renegotiated, or compromised as they enter
particular political economies” (2010, 38).
8
Kjaer 2004, 10.
9
For an especially useful entry point to this legal scholarship, see Drahozal 2009.
http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol12/iss3/art10
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dispute.10 Third, in arbitration, the disputants are for the most part free to choose
the procedural and substantive rules governing the dispute resolution process.11
Fourth, the arbitrator’s final decision—called an “award”—is binding on the
disputants. When the claimant prevails, the award typically takes the form of an
order that the respondent (now the “award debtor”) pay a certain sum of money to
the claimant (now the “award creditor”).
A comparison with two leading alternatives to arbitration—mediation and
litigation—helps clarify these four characteristics. First, like arbitration,
mediation and litigation involve third parties. Like an arbitrator, a mediator is a
private actor. In contrast, the third party in litigation is a state actor (a judge).
Second, like arbitration, mediation is consensual. Litigation, however, is nonconsensual: once one disputant (the plaintiff) initiates the litigation process, the
other disputant (the defendant) may be bound by the judge’s decision even
without its consent. Third, in contrast to arbitration and mediation processes,
which are generally governed by rules agreed upon by the disputants, state law
Fourth, whereas
determines the rules governing litigation procedures.12
arbitrators’ and judges’ decisions are legally binding, mediators do not make
binding decisions.
Transnational commercial arbitration involves the arbitration of disputes
arising out of commercial activity having connections to more than one state.
These connections may be territorial, when the activity or its effects touch the
territory of more than one state; or they may be based on legal relationships
between a state and the actors engaged in or affected by that activity, such as
citizenship.13 Investor-state arbitration—the arbitration of disputes between a
state and a foreign investor in that state—is generally treated as a distinct form of
transnational arbitration, and is not discussed in this article.
There are two basic types of transnational commercial arbitration:
“institutional” and “ad hoc.” In institutional arbitration, the disputants select an
existing private arbitral institution to administer the arbitration process. Along
10

Under some circumstances, an arbitration agreement between two or more parties may also be
binding on other parties based on legal theories such as agency and the “group of companies”
doctrine. Blackaby and Partasides 2009, 99-105; Born 2009, 1142. In general, once arbitration
has begun, a party does not have a right to stop the proceedings unilaterally. If a party fails to
participate in the proceedings, it runs the risk of a default award being entered against it.
Blackaby and Partasides 2009, 524.
11
This freedom is subject to mandatory provisions of law. See Born 2009, 1765.
12
I use the term “state” to refer a nation-state, not a territorial subunit thereof such as a “state” of
the United States.
13
I use the adjective “transnational” instead of “international” because the latter technically refers
only to states and their relations with each other, and does not include private actors. Nye &
Keohane 1971, 330-332. Thus, by transnational activity, I mean activity engaged in by state
and/or non-state actors having legal or territorial connections to more than one state.
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
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with that selection, the disputants often select the procedural rules developed by
that institution. Among the leading transnational arbitral institutions are the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the London Court of International
Arbitration (LCIA), and the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR)
of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).14 In ad hoc arbitration, the
parties do not select an arbitral institution to administer the arbitration process,
and instead make their own administrative arrangements.
As noted above, arbitration depends on the disputants’ consent. This
consent can be given either before or after a dispute arises. Many transnational
contracts include ex ante arbitration clauses. A typical example of such a clause
is the one suggested by the ICC: “All disputes arising out of or in connection with
the present contract shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in
accordance with the said Rules.” Disputants may also agree after a dispute arises
to submit that dispute to arbitration. However, once a dispute has arisen,
litigation will often offer significant advantages to at least one of the disputants,
making ex post agreements to arbitrate difficult to reach. For this reason, while
transnational commercial arbitration is a common method for resolving disputes
related to contractual relationships, it is likely to be relatively rare in disputes
between parties who are not in preexisting contractual relationships.15
2.2 The Role of Arbitration in the Governance of Transnational Commerce
The transnational commercial arbitration system performs several closely related
functions in the governance of transnational commerce. First, by offering a
mechanism for third-party interpretation and enforcement of contracts, it provides
a means by which transnational actors can enhance the credibility of their
commitments to each other.16 Second, by providing a process for filling gaps in
contracts, arbitration can mitigate the incomplete contracting problems routinely
faced by transnational commercial actors.17 Third, the transnational commercial
arbitration system offers dispute resolution services that can help transnational
actors manage the costs of conflict in commercial relationships.18

14

A list of all the acronyms used in this article can be found in the appendix.
Born 2006, 37; Moses 2008, 17.
16
On the importance of third-party enforcement for credible commitments and, hence, for
contracting, see North 1993. See also Stone Sweet 2002, 324-326.
17
Blackaby & Partasides 2009, 536f.
18
Ashenfelter 1998, 88.
15
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Alternatively, these functions may be performed by domestic courts.19
However, arbitration is widely understood to have a number of advantages over
litigation as a method of transnational commercial dispute resolution. Arbitration
may offer a more neutral alternative to litigation in a court of a disputant’s home
country. Whereas state-made rules govern the litigation process, arbitration is a
flexible process that the disputants themselves can tailor to their needs. While
litigation ordinarily is public, the disputants can agree to keep arbitral proceedings
confidential. Perhaps most importantly from the perspective of disputants, it is
generally easier to enforce an arbitral award issued in one country against the
assets of an award debtor in another country than it is to do so with a judgment of
a court.20
But arbitration is not without its disadvantages. Although it was once
considered a speedier and less expensive method of transnational commercial
dispute resolution, this perception may be eroding.21 Moreover, there generally is
no right to appeal an arbitrator’s decision. Another disadvantage is that
arbitrators lack the coercive power of the state that courts can use to compel
disputants and third parties to produce information relevant to the dispute.
However, arbitrators may draw adverse inferences from a disputant’s refusal to
make available relevant information, and in some countries (including the United
States) judicial enforcement of arbitral orders to produce evidence is available.22
Finally, because of its consensual nature, arbitration ordinarily cannot be imposed
on a person who is not a party to the arbitration agreement.23
2.3 The Empirical Importance of Transnational Commercial Arbitration
Ex ante arbitration clauses are common in transnational commercial contracts.
However, their frequency is difficult to estimate. One observer claims that more
than ninety percent of all transnational commercial contracts contain an
arbitration clause,24 while another argues that the actual frequency of arbitration
clauses is substantially lower.25 According to a recent empirical analysis, only
twenty percent of the transnational contracts of U.S. public companies filed with
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) contain arbitration
19

For a discussion of the role of domestic courts in global governance, see Whytock 2009. For a
discussion of the factors influencing transnational actors’ selection of arbitration versus litigation
from the perspective of rational institutional design theory, see Mattli 2001.
20
Born 2009, 78.
21
McIlwrath & Schroeder 2008.
22
Blackaby & Partasides 2009, 318f; Born 2009, 1919-1929.
23
Blackaby & Partasides 2009, 39, 99-106.
24
Berger 1999, 111.
25
Born 2009, 71.
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clauses.26 However, this analysis has been criticized as suffering from selection
bias because contracts filed with the SEC may often be precisely the sorts of
contracts for which arbitration is least appropriate.27
Even if the frequency of arbitration clauses is difficult to estimate, dispute
resolution trends suggest that transnational commercial arbitration is increasingly
widespread, as shown in Figure 1. The annual rate of filings with the world’s
major international arbitral institutions has increased steadily from 1,148 in 1992
to more than 3,700 in 2008.28 Similar data is not available for ad hoc arbitration.
While some observers speculate that ad hoc arbitrations are few compared to
institutional arbitrations, others suggest that institutional and ad hoc arbitration
rates are similar, and still others conjecture that ad hoc transnational arbitrations
may in fact outnumber institutional transnational arbitrations.29
One benchmark for assessing transnational commercial arbitration trends
in the leading arbitral institutions is to compare them to transnational contract
litigation trends in the U.S. federal district courts. To estimate transnational
contract litigation trends, I analyzed data collected by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts on civil lawsuits filed each year in the district courts.30
26

Eisenberg & Miller 2007, 350-352.
Drahozal & Ware 2010, 460.
28
HKIAC 2009. The arbitral institutions included in this count are the AAA, the ICC, and the
LCIA, as well as the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC),
Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC), the Japan Commercial Arbitration
Association (JCAA), the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB), the Kuala Lumpur
Regional Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA), the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC),
the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), and the British
Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Centre (BCICAC). Because the data collected by
the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre does not include ad hoc transnational commercial
arbitration, and because data for some institutions include domestic as well as transnational
arbitrations, these trends are an imperfect measure of overall transnational commercial arbitration
rates.
29
Drahozal & Naimark 2005, 7.
30
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) data is part of the Federal Court
Cases: Integrated Database Series, available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Science Research (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/00072).
Specifically, I analyzed contract claims over which the subject matter jurisdiction of the U.S.
federal courts is based on the fact that the dispute is between a citizen of a U.S. state and a citizen
of a foreign country (i.e., alienage jurisdiction), as contained in the AO’s annual civil terminations
data. To extract these cases from the data, I used the residence variable (which indicates the
citizenship of the parties) and the nature of suit variable (which identifies the type of dispute being
litigated, including contract disputes). I excluded two types of claims categorized by the AO as
“contract claims”—Miller Act claims and stockholder suits—since they are unlikely to be subject
to transnational arbitration, and their inclusion would thus risk biasing the comparison in favor of
litigation. One disadvantage of the civil terminations data is that the record for a case (including
its filing date) does not appear in that data until the case has terminated (that is, until proceedings
have come to an end due to settlement, judgment, or otherwise). Cases filed in earlier years but
27

http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol12/iss3/art10
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Of course, transnational contract litigation in the U.S. federal district courts is just
part of overall transnational commercial litigation worldwide. However, similar
data is not available for transnational commercial litigation in U.S. state courts
and courts in other countries.

Figure 1
Filings in U.S. Courts and Major Arbitral Institutions
Using this benchmark, Figure 1 shows that, as transnational commercial
arbitration filings in the world’s leading arbitral institutions have been increasing,
transnational contract litigation filings in the U.S. federal district courts have been
decreasing. In 1994, the total number of arbitration filings in the world’s leading
arbitral institutions surpassed the number of transnational contract litigation
filings in the U.S. federal district courts for the first time; and by 2006 the former
which have not yet terminated will be missing from the data. Because lawsuits often last multiple
years, this lag is likely to be particularly significant in the more recent years for which data is
available. Therefore, to mitigate bias in favor of arbitration, I present results only through 2006.
For more details on this data, see Whytock (2008b). However, because Whytock (2008b)
analyzes terminations of claims while this article analyzes filings, the exact results differ.
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
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was substantially higher than the latter. As of 2006, the annual number of
transnational commercial arbitration filings in each of the two most prominent
arbitral institutions—the AAA and the ICC—was still individually lower than the
annual number of transnational contract litigation filings in the U.S. federal
district courts. However, if current trends continue, the AAA and the ICC each
will soon be resolving more transnational commercial disputes than the U.S.
federal district courts.31
In summary, transnational commercial arbitration is an increasingly
widespread form of global governance. The upward trend in the number of
disputes filed in the world’s leading arbitral institutions is particularly striking
when compared to the downward trend in transnational contract disputes filed in
the U.S. federal district courts.
3. Rule-Making in Transnational Commercial Arbitration
The rules of the transnational commercial arbitration system include rules
governing the system as such—for example, rules regarding the enforcement of
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards—as well as procedural and substantive
rules governing particular arbitral proceedings. Who makes these rules? Scholars
have tended to treat the transnational commercial arbitration system as a private
form of global governance. However, through a combination of international
treaties and domestic law, states—working closely with private organizations—
have played a fundamental role in making the rules governing the system. These
rules provide critical, if qualified, support for transnational commercial
arbitration. Private actors play a leading role in determining which rules govern
particular arbitral proceedings—but here, too, the state plays an important role by
supplying rules that private disputants frequently choose. Private-public
interactions thus pervade both dimensions of rulemaking.
3.1 The Rules Governing the Transnational Commercial Arbitration System
The most important transnational commercial arbitration treaty is the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (known as the New York Convention).32 Although made by states, the
New York Convention is a product of private-public interaction. The ICC—a
nongovernmental organization—produced the first draft, which the United
31

The extent to which these trends are causally related is unclear; see Whytock 2008b, 48f.
This paper does not discuss two other important transnational commercial arbitration treaties:
the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (known as the Panama
Convention), and the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.

32
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Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) then revised; and the 45 state
participants at the United Nations Conference on Commercial Arbitration
finalized the convention in 1958.33 As one arbitration expert puts it, the
convention “provides what amounts to a universal constitutional charter for the
international arbitral process, whose sweeping terms have enabled both national
courts and arbitral tribunals to develop durable, effective means for enforcing
international arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.”34 As another puts it, the
convention “is the foundation on which the whole of the edifice of international
arbitration rests.”35
Article II of the New York Convention establishes a general rule that
signatory states shall recognize written arbitration agreements “concerning a
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.” It also requires the domestic
courts of signatory states, at the request of a party to an arbitration agreement, to
refer the parties to that agreement to arbitration “unless it finds that the said
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”
Article III establishes a general rule that signatory states shall recognize
and enforce arbitral awards. Article V specifies a series of exceptions to this
general rule, allowing refusal of enforcement “at the request of the party against
whom it is invoked,” if that party proves to the competent authority where
enforcement is sought that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to
them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which
the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the
country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to
present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms
of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of
the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which
contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which,
that award was made.

33

Born 2009, 93f.
Born 2009, 92f.
35
Kerr 1997, 127. See also Reisman 1992.
34
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Article V also allows refusal of enforcement “if the competent authority in the
country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: (a) The subject
matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law
of that country; or (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country.”
As one measure of the breadth of state support for these foundational rules
of the transnational commercial arbitration system, I gathered data on the number
of states that have become parties to the New York Convention over time.36 As
Figure 2 shows, the number increased from nine in 1960, to fifty-five in 1980, to
124 in 2000. As of 2009, the New York Convention had entered into force in 144
of the 192 members of the United Nations. These results suggest broad and
steadily increasing state support for the rules favoring enforcement of arbitration
agreements and arbitral awards.

Figure 2
Cumulative Number of State Parties to New York Convention,
by Year of Entry into Force
36

The source of my data is the table of signatories to the New York Convention maintained by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
See
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (accessed
December 15, 2009).
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In addition, individual states have enacted domestic laws providing for domestic
judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. For example,
in the United States, Section 206 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) authorizes
U.S. courts to order arbitration in accordance with an arbitration agreement
covered by the New York Convention.37 Section 207 of the FAA requires U.S.
courts to enforce an arbitral award covered by the New York Convention “unless
it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of
the award specified in the said Convention.” In addition to the FAA, the U.S.
Supreme Court has announced a variety of important rules governing the
enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards by U.S. courts, and is
generally considered to have a strong pro-arbitration policy.
Other states have also adopted domestic laws governing transnational
commercial arbitration. For example, some states have adopted domestic
legislation based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which,
among other things, provides for enforcement of arbitration agreements and
Although the Model Law was produced by an
arbitral awards.38
intergovernmental entity—UNCITRAL—it was developed in consultation with
private experts and arbitral institutions, and is thus, like the New York
Convention, a result of private-public interaction.39 The UN General Assembly
has encouraged states to consider the Model Law, but there is no requirement that
states adopt it—it is only a model upon which states may base domestic
legislation. Thus, its legal status depends on state legislative action.
As another measure of the breadth of state support for the rules governing
the transnational commercial arbitration system, I gathered data on the number of
states that have enacted legislation based on the Model Law.40 As Figure 3

37

The full text of Section 206 is as follows: “A court having jurisdiction under this chapter may
direct that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided for,
whether that place is within or without the United States. Such court may also appoint arbitrators
in accordance with the provisions of the agreement.”
38
Moses 2008, 64. Under Article 8(1) of the Model Act, “A court before which an action is
brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so requests not
later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to
arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.” Article 35 states the general rule that arbitral awards shall be enforced, and Article 36
specifies exceptions to enforcement. The Model Law was amended in 2006. Article 34 specifies
the circumstances in which a court may set aside an arbitral award.
39
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 2006, vii.
40
The source of my data is UNCITRAL’s list of national legislation based on the Model Law. See
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html
(accessed December 15, 2009). This count does not include nine U.S. states (California,
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shows, the number has increased steadily from one in 1986, to thirty-five in 2000,
to a total of sixty-one as of 2008. This trend suggests increasingly widespread
state support for the transnational commercial arbitration system.

Figure 3
Cumulative Number of States
with Domestic Legislation Based on UNCITRAL Model Law, by Year
In summary, the basic rules governing the transnational commercial
arbitration system—including the rules governing the enforcement of arbitration
agreements and arbitral awards—are a result of private-public interaction. States
have demonstrated broad support for those rules through increasingly widespread
adoption of international and domestic legal instruments such as the New York
Convention and legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law.

Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Oregon, and Texas), each of which have enacted legislation based
on the Model Act.
http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol12/iss3/art10
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3.2 The Rules Governing Particular Arbitrations
While states have enacted rules providing foundations for the transnational
commercial arbitration system, private actors play the leading role in specifying
the rules governing particular arbitral proceedings. These include both procedural
rules, which specify how an arbitral proceeding should be conducted, and
substantive rules, which are applied to the activity of the disputants that gave rise
to the dispute.
One of the defining features of transnational commercial arbitration is the
ability of the disputants themselves to specify the applicable procedural rules,
subject to any mandatory provisions of the law of the state in which the arbitration
takes place.41 Procedural rules cover matters such as the number and selection of
arbitrators, the place and language of the arbitral proceedings, the written
submissions and oral arguments that the disputants are allowed to make, the
presentation of evidence, and the testimony of witnesses. In theory, disputants
can create their own procedural rules from scratch. In practice, however, they
generally specify an existing set of procedural rules, adopting them either in their
entirety or with modifications.
The world’s leading private arbitral institutions have developed various
sets of procedural rules. When disputants opt for institutional arbitration, they
typically will also opt for the procedural rules of the administering institution.
For example, for arbitrations administered by the AAA’s International Centre for
Dispute Resolution (ICDR), the disputants will ordinarily select the ICDR’s own
procedural rules.42 When the disputants select an arbitral institution’s procedural
rules, those rules are private in a double sense: they were produced by a private
institution rather than a state, and they are selected by agreement of the disputants
rather than imposed by law.
Even disputants who opt for ad hoc arbitration will not necessarily create
their own procedural rules from scratch. They, too, will often select an existing
set of rules, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.43 UNCITRAL developed
these rules in consultation with private arbitral institutions, and then formally
adopted them. The United Nations General Assembly then passed a resolution
recommending their use and widespread distribution.44 These rules are thus a
product of private-public interaction—namely, between an intergovernmental
organization (UNCITRAL) and various private arbitral institutions.
41

Blackaby & Partasides 2009, 180.
In fact, the ICDR’s model arbitration clause includes selection of its International Arbitration
Rules. See http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4945 (last accessed August 27, 2010).
43
These rules, adopted by UNCITRAL on April 28, 1976, are available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf (last accessed August
27, 2010).
44
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 31/98, December 15, 1976.
42
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Whereas procedural rules govern the arbitral process, substantive rules
govern the activity of the disputants that gave rise to the dispute. The arbitrator is
expected to determine whether the respondent’s behavior violated the applicable
substantive rules and, if so, to issue an award in favor of the claimant.45
Disputants may specify the applicable substantive rules by including a choice-oflaw clause in their contracts. Disputants may specify private rules, including
transnational commercial customs, which are sometimes referred to as “lex
mercatoria” or “transnational law.” Or they may specify public rules, such as the
national law of a particular state, or hybrid rules.
Hybrid substantive rules include the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts. UNIDROIT—the International Institute for
the Unification of Private Law—is an intergovernmental organization that aims to
facilitate global harmonization of commercial law.46 To develop its Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, UNIDROIT worked closely with private
actors, including lawyers and legal scholars, with the goal of providing “a system
of rules especially tailored to the needs of international commercial
transactions.”47 Thus, like UNCITRAL’s procedural rules, the UNIDROIT
Principles are a product of private-public interaction. The UNIDROIT Principles
are not legally binding, and they have not been adopted as state law. However,
disputants sometimes select them as a source of substantive rules.
As one measure of the relative importance of public, private, and hybrid
sources of substantive rules, Table 1 presents the rates at which disputants have
selected national law rather than other sources in ICC arbitrations between 2003
and 2008.48 The data shows that national law is the most widely used source of
substantive rules in ICC arbitrations. In approximately eighty percent of ICC
arbitrations between 2003 and 2008, the parties specifically selected national law,
and in only approximately one to three percent of ICC arbitrations did the parties
select other sources.49 These figures suggest that the substantive rules applied in
transnational commercial arbitration are usually drawn from public rather than
private or hybrid sources. Similar data would have to be collected for non-ICC
arbitrations in order to reach more certain conclusions.50

45

In practice, the award may be mixed, with some elements favoring the claimant, and others
favoring the respondent. Thus, there will not necessarily be clear winners and losers.
46
See http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid=84219 (last accessed August 27, 2010).
47
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 1994, viii.
48
The source of my data is the annual statistical reports of the ICC contained in the ICC’s
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin. See Drahozal 2009, 1039, Table 2 (compiling 20032007 data); ICC 2009, 12 (2008 data).
49
When the disputants fail to specify the applicable substantive law, the arbitrator ordinarily will
do so. See Blackaby and Partasides 2009, 230f.
50
Drahozal 2009, 1039.
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Table 1
Source of Substantive Rules Selected by the Parties in ICC Arbitrations
2003
National
Law
Other
Source
No
Selection

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

80.4%

79.1%

79.3%

82.7%

79.3%

84.0%

1.2%

1.3%

1.7%

2.0%

0.5%

3.0%

18.3%

19.6%

19.0%

15.3%

20.2%

13.2%

Source: Annual Statistical Reports of the ICC, from International Court of Arbitration Bulletin,
var. years.

Other studies also suggest that the use of private sources of substantive
rules is relatively infrequent.51 It appears that a principal reason why
transnational commercial actors avoid these sources is that they tend to consider
them too vague to provide meaningful behavioral guidance.52 As one expert
practitioner of transnational commercial arbitration explains:
There is much academic debate, but little judicial authority, about
what [non-national choice-of-law clauses] mean, and there are
doubts [about] how widely they are enforceable . . . . Save where
there is some powerful countervailing reason, business enterprises
should not expose themselves to the uncertainties or expenses that
participation in this scholastic debate could entail.53

51

E.g. Dasser 2008, 131 (finding a total of only 79 cases in which a non-national legal standard
was applied in arbitration, 32 of which also involved application of a national law); Drahozal
2005, 540 (finding that 26.7%, or four of fifteen, international joint venture agreements publicly
filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission between 1993 and 1996
contained arbitration clauses referring to either “international legal principles and practices” or
“general international commercial practices”). Nevertheless, one study suggests that there is at
least fairly widespread awareness of the use of private and hybrid sources of substantive law in
transnational commercial arbitration. E.g. Berger et al 2001, 96, 104 (survey study of in-house
counsels, attorneys, arbitrators and other persons working in the field of international business law
finding that 42% of respondents, of which a disproportionate number were Swiss or German, were
aware of the use of non-state law in transnational commercial arbitration).
52
Drahozal 2008, 671.
53
Born 2006, 124.
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Even if the rules applied in transnational commercial arbitration have
primarily public sources, they are privately determined insofar as the disputants
themselves (or, in some cases, the arbitrators) decide which rules will govern.
Here, again, private-public interaction plays an important role in transnational
commercial arbitration.54
In summary, states play a leading role in providing the foundations for the
transnational commercial arbitration system. For their part, private actors play a
leading role in determining the rules governing particular arbitral proceedings. In
both areas of rule-making, there is substantial private-public interaction.
4. Enforcement in Transnational Commercial Arbitration
The principal enforcement problems in transnational commercial arbitration
involve ex ante arbitration clauses and arbitral awards. Parties often include an
arbitration clause in their transnational contracts. Their decision to do so is a
private choice, and may be based on a mutual belief that arbitration would be
preferable to litigation in the event of a dispute. Alternatively, the arbitration
clause may have resulted from bargaining: the parties may disagree about the
desirability of arbitration, but the party opposing arbitration may accept the
arbitration clause in exchange for concessions from the party preferring
arbitration. In this sense, transnational actors’ “forum shopping” decisions are
often a result of bargaining rather than simple rational choice.
In either case, after a dispute arises or becomes likely, a party may
conclude that it will be more likely to win (or likely to win more or lose less) in
litigation than in arbitration. For example, a claimant may conclude ex post that it
is more likely to win if it is able to present its case to a jury, or if it is able to add
claims against additional parties that are not bound by the arbitration clause—all
of which generally is possible in litigation but not arbitration. Such ex post
assessments not only reduce the likelihood of ex post agreement to submit
disputes to arbitration, but also increase the likelihood that a party will pursue
litigation even if there is an ex ante arbitration clause. For example, the party
may argue that the arbitration clause is invalid or does not cover the type of
dispute that has arisen.55
Even if both parties follow their arbitration agreement and refrain from
litigation, and the arbitrator issues an award in favor of the claimant and against
the respondent, the respondent may fail to comply with the award. For example,

54

O’Hara and Ribstein (2009) usefully describe the interactions between states that supply legal
rules and private actors that choose them as a “law market.”
55
Bermann 2003, 374.
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the arbitrator may issue an award requiring the respondent to make a monetary
payment to the claimant, but the respondent may refuse to pay.
A combination of private and public processes mitigates enforcement
problems like these. For example, private enforcement of arbitration agreements
and arbitral awards using reputational sanctions can enhance rule-following in
transnational commercial arbitration.56 The logic is as follows: If an actor’s
reputation for keeping its commitments is good, that reputation will increase the
actor’s opportunities for entering profitable transactions with other actors who are
aware of that reputation. If the reputation is bad, it will decrease those
opportunities. Therefore, an actor’s reputation for keeping its commitments is a
valuable asset. The actor has an incentive to keep its commitments—including
agreements to arbitrate and abide by arbitral awards—because noncompliance
will harm that reputation.57 Insofar as an actor desires to enter arbitration
agreements in the future and avoid litigation, that actor will have a particularly
strong incentive to foster a good reputation for complying with arbitration
agreements and arbitral awards.58
However, reputational sanctions are likely to be effective only under
certain conditions. For example, there must be a mechanism for disseminating
information about parties’ behavior—information is, after all, the link between
behavior and reputation.59 If A breaches an agreement to arbitrate with B, or
refuses to comply with the resulting arbitral award, B obviously has knowledge of
this, but absent a broader information-dissemination mechanism, other actors do
not necessarily have this knowledge, potentially leaving A’s general reputation
unharmed.60 One important value associated with arbitration, and often required
by the disputants’ agreement—confidentiality—makes it particularly challenging
to satisfy the information requirement with respect to compliance with arbitral
awards. Confidentiality aside, as the size of a community increases, it becomes
increasingly difficult for any given actor to keep track of the conduct and
reputations of others. For these reasons, private enforcement is most likely to
56

Benson 1998, 95; Stone Sweet 2002, 325.
Shepsle 1986, 71.
58
Private enforcement based on reputational sanctions likely plays an especially important role in
enhancing rule-following by arbitrators. After all, arbitrators depend on disputants for
employment, and disputants are unlikely to hire arbitrators with reputations for partiality,
inefficiency, or infidelity to the rules set by the disputants.
59
See Stone Sweet 2002, 325 (“This solution, of course, depends entirely on the organization of
information and monitoring capacities, a collective good that, given the myriad costs involved,
may or may not be generated by the traders themselves.”).
60
See Guzman 2002, 1862f (“The extent to which a violation is known by the relevant players
affects the reputational consequences of the violation. Obviously, if a violation takes place, but no
other state has knowledge of it, there is no reputational loss. The reputational consequences will
also be less if only a small number of countries know of the violation.”).
57

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2034561

17

Business and Politics, Vol. 12 [2010], Iss. 3, Art. 10

play a significant role in rule-following in relatively small, well-defined, and
enduring communities, in which the parties are able to monitor each other and are
likely to have repeated interactions. The implication is that the transnational
commercial arbitration system—which operates at a global scale—probably
cannot rely primarily on reputational sanctions to mitigate enforcement problems.
Enforcement problems in transnational commercial arbitration have also
been addressed by domestic courts. They help solve these problems both by
enforcing arbitration agreements and arbitral awards in particular cases, and by
discouraging noncompliance in the first place by signaling to transnational
commercial actors that judicial enforcement is likely. First, when one party to an
arbitration agreement fails to abide by that agreement, the other party can seek
judicial enforcement of the agreement.61 And when a party against whom an
arbitral award has been issued fails to comply with that award, the other party can
seek judicial enforcement of that award. As discussed above, states have
provided the foundations for judicial enforcement through international and
domestic law. However, judicial enforcement is privately triggered in the sense
that it depends on a request from one of the disputants.
In addition, domestic courts can support the rules governing transnational
commercial arbitration by refusing to enforce arbitration agreements or arbitral
awards that are inconsistent with those rules. For example, they can support the
rule that arbitration requires the consent of the disputants by refusing to enforce
arbitration agreements that are null and void as the result of fraud.62 Similarly,
they can support the rule that disputants must have notice of arbitral proceedings
and an opportunity to present their cases by refusing to enforce awards that result
from proceedings in which a disputant received no such notice or had no such
opportunity.63 And they can support the rule that arbitrators shall not exceed the
scope of authority granted to them by the disputants and permitted by law by
refusing to enforce awards that exceed that scope.64
61

Domestic courts can use a variety of methods to enforce an arbitration agreement, including an
order compelling arbitration, an order dismissing or staying litigation of disputes that are covered
by an arbitration agreement, or an “anti-suit injunction” prohibiting a party from filing or
proceeding with litigation of such a dispute in a foreign court. For a detailed analysis of the
various methods used by domestic courts to enforce transnational commercial arbitration
agreements, see Born 2009, chap. 7.
62
See the exception to enforcement in Article II(3) (“unless [the court] finds that the [arbitration
agreement] is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”).
63
See the exception to enforcement in Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention (“The party
against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the
arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case.”)
64
Blackaby & Partasides 2009, 314f, 598. See, for example, the exception to enforcement in
Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention (“The award deals with a difference not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration . . . .”).
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Empirical evidence suggests that domestic courts play a significant role in
the enforcement of awards following transnational commercial arbitration. For
example, a survey on the post-award experience of claimants in 205 transnational
commercial arbitrations in the AAA between 1999 and 2002 reveals considerable
levels of post-award judicial involvement. In 100 cases, the claimant prevailed
and the award debtor eventually complied fully or partially with the award.65 Of
those one hundred cases, there was judicial confirmation of the award in sixtyeight cases and judicial enforcement in twelve cases.66 Even then, full
compliance was the result in only seventy-four of the one hundred cases, while
there was partial compliance in four cases and the parties renegotiated the award
in twenty-two cases. Of the remaining 105 cases, the award debtor failed to
comply in thirty-five cases; a court vacated the award in one case; fifty-one cases
were still pending in a court action; and the claimant lost in eighteen cases.67 A
more recent study estimates that the U.S. federal district courts have been called
upon hundreds of times to enforce arbitral awards covered by the New York
Convention.68
Second, domestic courts mitigate enforcement problems by signaling to
transnational commercial actors that they are likely to enforce arbitration
agreements, arbitral awards, and the rules governing the transnational commercial
arbitration system.69 Other things being equal, the higher the perceived
probability of judicial enforcement, the higher the probability that transnational
actors will comply before actual judicial enforcement is necessary. After all, as
the probability of judicial enforcement increases, the willingness of a party to
incur the costs needed to resist enforcement should decrease.70 This perceived
probability is largely a function of the prior published enforcement decisions of
65

Naimark & Keer 2005, 271.
Naimark & Keer 2005, 271.
67
Naimark & Keer 2005, 271. As the authors note: “A total of 35 cases reported non-compliance
with the award. Fifty-one cases were unresolved at the time of the survey and were pending in a
court action of some type. Those 51 cases tended to be the most recently awarded matters and had
not, therefore, sufficiently ‘ripened’ to demonstrate a final result. While we have no further data
on the final outcomes of those 51 cases it seems likely that they will eventually show the same
patterns of post-award results as the other 154 cases [i.e. compliance in 118 cases, non-compliance
in 35 cases, award vacated in 1 case].” Naimark & Keer 2005, 271.
68
Whytock 2008b, 63-67.
69
See Drahozal 2009, 1040 (“While it appears that most international arbitration awards are
complied with voluntarily, the available empirical evidence suggests that public courts nonetheless
play an important role in the process.”); Whytock 2008a, 470 (“Transnational [arbitration] to an
important extent . . . relies on domestic courts for enforcement.”).
70
This is a simple extension of the basic economic model of the decision to litigate. According to
that model, a plaintiff will only file a claim if the expected value of the claim (which equals the
probability that the plaintiff will win (p) times the amount of recovery if it wins (w)), less the costs
of suit, is greater than zero. The so-called “filing condition” is thus (p*w)-c>0. Bone 2003, 34.
66
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domestic courts. The higher the rate of enforcement in those decisions, the higher
the perceived probability of future enforcement. Thus, perhaps even more
important than judicial enforcement in particular cases is the expectation of
judicial enforcement in potential future cases. A disputant’s rule-following
behavior thus depends significantly on the anticipated behavior of domestic
courts—namely, the disputant’s expectations about whether a domestic court will
enforce an arbitration agreement or arbitral award if the disputant fails to comply
with it. This impact of domestic court decisions on the behavior of transnational
actors beyond the parties to particular disputes is an example of the “transnational
shadow of the law.”71
To shed empirical light on judicial signaling regarding the enforcement of
arbitral awards, I created a dataset of all U.S. federal district court decisions
between 1970 and 2008 published in the Westlaw database involving enforcement
of arbitral awards covered by the New York Convention.72 I coded each decision
based on whether it was a decision to enforce the arbitral award in full or not. If
the decision was to enforce in full, the decision was coded as “yes”; otherwise, the
decision was coded as “no.”73

Table 2
Enforcement Rates of Arbitral Awards Covered by the New York
Convention
Award Fully Enforced?

Number of Decisions

Percentage of Decisions

Yes

112

77.2%

No

33

22.8%

Total

145

100.0%

Note: This table presents the rate at which the U.S. federal district courts have fully enforced
arbitral awards covered by the New York Convention in published decisions between 1970 and
2008.

71

Whytock 2009, 29f.
The search was conducted on October 10, 2008. For details regarding the dataset, see Whytock
2008b, 57f.
73
Occasionally, awards are partially enforced or enforcement decisions are stayed pending the
outcome of parallel foreign proceedings to vacate or set aside an award. I coded these decisions as
“no,” indicating that there was not full enforcement. For coding details, see Whytock 2008b, 72f.
72
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The results, presented in Table 2, show that between 1970 and 2008, the
U.S. federal district courts have fully enforced arbitral awards covered by the
New York Convention at an estimated rate of 77.2 percent in their published
decisions.74 The signal that appears is that attempts to resist enforcement are
more likely than not to fail. It is more by creating these expectations than by
providing enforcement in particular cases that domestic courts support the
transnational commercial arbitration system.75
At the same time, my findings suggest that the U.S. district courts are also
sending the signal that they do not automatically enforce arbitral awards, but are
instead willing to perform a monitoring role, as the New York Convention allows
them to do, to evaluate whether particular arbitral proceedings are consistent with
minimal due process standards and public policy.76 This willingness may not
only enhance the perceived legitimacy of the transnational commercial arbitration
system, but also help address the concerns of some practitioners about the lack of
a right of appeal in arbitration.77
By preventing domestic courts from performing their monitoring role in
the transnational commercial arbitration system, states risk eroding the system’s
legitimacy. For example, a law adopted by Belgium in 1985 barred review of
arbitral awards by Belgian courts in arbitrations not involving Belgian citizens or
businesses located in Belgium. As Moses explains: “It was believed at the time
that this would increase the number of arbitrations in Belgium. In fact, however,
the law had the opposite effect. Businesses were not drawn to a system with no
possible court review. It appeared instead that businesses were avoiding Belgium
74

In 3.5% of published decisions, the U.S. district courts either partially enforced the award or
stayed enforcement proceedings. Whytock 2008b, 72f. Based on the theory that judges are less
likely to publish mundane decisions and the assumption that judges view enforcement of arbitral
awards to be the norm, it is possible that the overall enforcement rate, including in unpublished
decisions, is higher than in published decisions. See Drahozal and Naimark 2005, 264.
75
Whytock 2008a, 470f.
76
See e.g. New York Convention, Article V(1)(a) (“Recognition and enforcement of the award
may be refused . . . [if] . . . [t]he party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case . . . .”), Article V(1)(d) (allowing refusal to recognize or enforce an
arbitral award when “the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place”), and Article V(2)(b) (“Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award
may . . . be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is
sought finds that [t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country.”).
77
Born (2006, 6) summarizes the tradeoff: “Dispensing with appellate review reduces both
litigation costs and delays. On the other hand, it also means that wildly eccentric, or simply
wrong, arbitral decisions cannot be corrected.”). Callahan (2006, 31, 49) has found that a major
reason for preferring litigation over arbitration is the availability of appellate review in litigation.
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as a place of arbitration.”78 Belgium therefore amended the law in 1998, allowing
parties to opt out of judicial review, but no longer barring such review.79
In summary, both private actors and state actors help mitigate enforcement
problems in the transnational commercial arbitration system. Private actors do so
by applying reputational sanctions. States, through their domestic courts, do so
by enforcing arbitration agreements and arbitral awards in particular disputes, and
fostering expectations of enforcement in potential future disputes.
5. Conclusion
Although global governance scholars have tended to treat the transnational
commercial arbitration system as a private form of global governance, this article
has shed light on the role of the state in that system. Specifically, I have argued
that both rule-making and enforcement in the system depend largely on
interactions between private and public actors. Therefore, I suggest that scholars
treat the transnational commercial arbitration system as a mixed private-public
form of governance and devote more effort to understanding private-public
interaction in the system.
An improved understanding of private-public interaction in transnational
commercial arbitration will help scholars contribute more effectively to the
solution of difficult normative problems and theoretical puzzles. Normatively, the
question of private-public interaction goes to the heart of hopes and fears about
the transnational commercial arbitration system. On the one hand, scholars have
noted that by reducing the reach of state control over transnational business, the
system can decrease transaction costs and increase private autonomy in
transnational commercial relations.80 On the other hand, scholars have expressed
concern that by freeing transnational business actors from state-based legal
regulation, the system may unduly prioritize facilitation of transnational business
transactions over other objectives of public policy such as distributive justice and
the regulation of the negative externalities of transnational business activity.81
But the extent to which these hopes and fears reflect reality depends largely on the
nature and extent of state involvement in the transnational commercial arbitration
system. Thus, by improving our understanding of private-public interaction in
78

Moses 2008, 57.
Moses 2008, 57.
80
See, e.g., Mattli 2001, 921; Stone Sweet 2006, 627.
81
See, e.g., Cutler 2003, 226. As Wai (2002, 212, 231) puts it in an important law review article,
by contributing to “the transnational liftoff of international business transactions from national
regulatory oversight,” the transnational commercial arbitration system may undermine
“worthwhile policy objectives such as distributive justice, democratic political governance, or
effective transnational regulation.”
79
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transnational commercial arbitration, we can improve our understanding of both
its promises and perils.
A better understanding of private-public interaction is also necessary to
solve one of the central puzzles of the transnational commercial arbitration
system: What explains state support for that system? Broad support was not
inevitable. States could have instead attempted to preserve transnational litigation
in domestic courts as the dominant method of transnational commercial dispute
resolution and a leading instrument of state governance of transnational
commercial activity. From a traditional state-focused perspective on world
politics, this alternative would have seemed most likely. Why would states
encourage a system of global governance in which they substantially share power
with private actors? One theory emphasizes private political pressure on states to
support arbitration as a transnational dispute resolution alternative to litigation,82
while another emphasizes economic competition among states to attract
transnational arbitration business.83 Central to both accounts are interactions
between private and public actors. By exploiting cross-national and temporal
variation in states’ adoption of the various domestic and international legal
instruments that support the transnational commercial arbitration system, and with
careful historical process tracing, scholars can begin refining and empirically
testing these theories.
Finally, while my primary goal in this article is to nudge global
governance scholarship on transnational commercial arbitration in a direction that
more strongly focuses on private-public interaction, this article also has
implications for the study of global governance more generally. Descriptively,
the article raises the possibility that there may not be purely private (or, for that
matter, purely public) forms of global governance. Analytically, even though it is
important to understand the distinct roles of private and public actors in global
governance, the article raises doubts about the desirability of a sharp conceptual
distinction between private and public forms of global governance. Scholars who
insist too strongly on this distinction run the risk of obscuring important
interactions between private and public actors. Theoretically, this article implies
that accounts of global governance processes—including rule-making and
enforcement processes—will remain incomplete if they lack an account of how
private and public actors interact in those processes.

82
83

E.g. Born 2009, 49f.; Dezalay & Garth 1996, 43f.
O’Hara & Ribstein 2009, 98-101.
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Appendix: List of Acronyms
AAA:

American Arbitration Association

ECOSOC:

United Nations Economic and Social Council

FAA:

U.S. Federal Arbitration Act

ICC:

International Chamber of Commerce

ICDR:

International Centre for Dispute Resolution of the American
Arbitration Association

LCIA:

London Court of International Arbitration

UNCITRAL: United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
UNIDROIT: International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
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